I work on different aspects of social epistemology; mostly using formal methods to study questions around opinion pooling, consensus, disagreement, altruism, and some further issues in the social dimensions of science.

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I define a network dynamics analogous to Thomas Schelling's model for segregation and show that even minor homophily can leads to polarization. Yet, the interaction between homopily and heterophily shows encouraging results, since heterophily has an integration effect in unequal populations, even in the presence of homophily.

David Hume's first develop a contagion account of opinions and moral passions. This can be formalized by making use of epidemiological diffusion models on networks. The question guiding the investigation is how does the social structure, represented as a network, affects the spread of opinions. For example, more hierarchical structures like trees and stars make it harder for emotions to spread than more "democratic" ones like random networks. More precisely, using epidemiological models of contagion I show the effect that networks variables like centrality, clustering, homophily, and others have on the contagion of moral sentiments.

I am currently studying how reinforcement learning algorithms, in particular contextual bandit methods like the Decision Service algorithm (best 2019 ACM AI award) may be affecting the way online communities shape their beliefs.

The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky [44]; Lehrer and Wagner [34]; McConway

We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling (Stewart and Ojea Quintana 2017). Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization (and a mild generalization of it), imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of (precise) externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner (2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile.

This paper focuses on

This essay bridges Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem (1955, 1977) with Adam Smith moral sentiments, and makes use of the formalism to characterize altruism, spite and self-interest in line with contemporary work by Kitcher (2010). This is a departure from the traditional understanding of Harsanyi's results as defining a utilitarian social welfare function. Instead, they here provide a formalization of Smith's tripartite distinction of other-directed attitudes. Furthermore, I will emphasize the importance of the recognition of unsocial passions like spite, and how this aspect of Smith's account makes Das Adam Smith Problem even harder to solve.

The purpose of this essay is to study the extent in which the semantics for different logical systems can be represented game theoretically. I will begin by considering different definitions of what it means to

During my time in Buenos Aires, I was focused in Logic and I worked on issues about circularity in paradoxes.

This led to two publications.

In this paper I argue that Roy Cook’s reformulation of Yablo’s Paradox in the infinitary system D is a genuinely

non-circular paradox, but for different reasons than the ones he sustained. In fact, the first part of the job will be to show that his argument regarding the absence of fixed points in the construction is insufficient to prove the non-circularity of it; at much it proves its non-self referentiality. The second is to reconsider the structural collapse approach Cook rejects, and argue that a correct understanding of it leads us to the claim that the infinitary paradox is actually non-circular.

This is an undergraduate essay (in Spanish, and quite rough) about the structure of the non-standard models that Yablo's Paradox has.