I work on different aspects of social epistemology; mostly using formal methods to study questions around opinion pooling, consensus, disagreement, altruism, and some further issues in the social dimensions of science.

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The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky [44]; Lehrer and Wagner [34]; McConway

We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling (Stewart and Ojea Quintana 2017). Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization (and a mild generalization of it), imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of (precise) externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner (2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile.

This paper focuses on

This essay bridges Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem (1955, 1977) with Adam Smith moral sentiments, and makes use of the formalism to characterize altruism, spite and self-interest in line with contemporary work by Kitcher (2010). This is a departure from the traditional understanding of Harsanyi's results as defining a utilitarian social welfare function. Instead, they here provide a formalization of Smith's tripartite distinction of other-directed attitudes. Furthermore, I will emphasize the importance of the recognition of unsocial passions like spite, and how this aspect of Smith's account makes Das Adam Smith Problem even harder to solve.

The sixth essay provides a representation of David Hume's contagion account of moral passions by making use of epidemiological diffusion models on networks. The question guiding the investigation is how does the social structure, represented as a network, affects the spread of emotions and opinions. For example, more hierarchical structures like trees and stars make it harder for emotions to spread than more "democratic" ones like random networks. More precisely, using epidemiological models of contagion I show the effect that networks variables like centrality, clustering, homophily, and others have on the contagion of moral sentiments.

The final chapter is concerned with polarization. I extend Thomas Schelling's model for segregation to networks of individuals with an different political stances and show that even minor disagreements leads to clustering and polarization. This is done by considering strategic network formations and network dynamics based on political homophily.

The purpose of this essay is to study the extent in which the semantics for different logical systems can be represented game theoretically. I will begin by considering different definitions of what it means to

During my time in Buenos Aires, I was focused in Logic and I worked on issues about circularity in paradoxes.

This led to two publications.

In this paper I argue that Roy Cook’s reformulation of Yablo’s Paradox in the infinitary system D is a genuinely

non-circular paradox, but for different reasons than the ones he sustained. In fact, the first part of the job will be to show that his argument regarding the absence of fixed points in the construction is insufficient to prove the non-circularity of it; at much it proves its non-self referentiality. The second is to reconsider the structural collapse approach Cook rejects, and argue that a correct understanding of it leads us to the claim that the infinitary paradox is actually non-circular.

This is an undergraduate essay (in Spanish, and quite rough) about the structure of the non-standard models that Yablo's Paradox has.